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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORY, FOREIGN POLICY 
SUBSTITUTABILITY, AND "NICE" 
LAWS 
By BENJAMIN A. MOST and HARVEY STARR* 
INTRODUCTION 
A pair of basic problems appear to have impeded the development 
of an integrative understanding of international nd foreign policy 
phenomena. The first has to do with the potential for foreign policy 
substitutability: through time and across space, similar factors could 
plausibly be expected to trigger different foreign policy acts. The second 
problem concerns the potential existence of "sometimes true," domain- 
specific laws. It is the logical opposite of the substitution problem: dif- 
ferent processes could plausibly be expected to lead to similar results. 
Neither problem appears to be well understood in the current literature; 
if anything, standard research practices uggest that both are ignored 
entirely. Nevertheless, they are potentially important. Taken together, 
they suggest hat scholars who are interested in developing a cumulative 
base of integrative knowledge about foreign policy and international 
relations phenomena should recognize that: 
I. If writers on the foreign policy behaviors of governments define 
"islands of theory" in terms of concrete phenomena, their work will 
not yield broad understanding. Ifgovernments behave differently to
pursue their (perhaps heterogeneous) national goals and, under at least 
certain conditions nations may substitute one means for another, then 
all of the behaviors that tend to be studied in fragmented fashion 
need to be conceived from the outset not as separate and distinct 
phenomena, the understanding of which will eventually be inte- 
grated-but rather as commensurable behaviors or component parts 
of abstract conceptual puzzles. 
2. Applications of the standard approaches for testing models and hy- 
potheses are likely to produce misleading results and lead analysts to 
reject theories and models that are "good," "nice," and "useful," even 
* This study was supported by NSF Grants SES-82-o8779 and SES-82-o8815. 
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if they are not general, or universally "true." If it is plausible to argue 
that states may pursue different goals, for different reasons and with 
different degrees of effectiveness, then it may be useful to reconsider 
the efforts to search for a "true," "general," or universally applicable 
explanation of what they do. It might instead be more sensible to 
search for models or theories that operate, hold, or are valid only 
under certain explicitly prescribed conditions. 
As a consequence of our analysis, we conclude that there is a need 
to reexamine some of the "grand" theoretical approaches found in the 
"traditional" literature. A new synthesis of tradition and science and of 
grand, middle, and narrow approaches seems to be needed. Finally, in 
contrast to arguments such as those presented by Waltz and Singer, we 
find that the most fruitful avenues for theorizing and research are at 
the microlevel, in which the focus is on decision making, expected utility 
calculations, and foreign policy interaction processes.' 
COMMON RESEARCH PRACTICES 
Several basic research practices and procedures have increasingly come 
to characterize much of the current quantitative research on foreign 
policy and international phenomena.2 
Empirical 'puzzles" and empirically defined islands. Recent theoretical 
and quantitative empirical research on foreign policy and international 
relations has tended to focus on the "middle level" in an apparent effort 
to develop "islands of theory," or solutions to middle-range "puzzles." 
While scholars argue that they are ultimately concerned with under- 
standing why states do what they do, they have eschewed efforts at 
"grand theory." They have tended to specialize their research-becom- 
ing arms race experts, alliance theorists, war analysts, students of arms 
transfers, specialists on the uses of foreign economic policy, experts on 
processes of international negotiation and conflict resolution, and so on.3 
I Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 
1979); J. David Singer, "Accounting for International War: The State of the Discipline," 
Journal of Peace Research i8 (No. i, 198I), i-i8. 
2 Exceptions could readily be cited. Our contention is only that the practices outlined 
below are typical of much of what is done, and that they seem to reflect how scholars 
approach their research problems. 
3 Analysts who work with the WEIS, CREON, and COPDAB events data sets adopt a 
different approach, of course. Rosenau's "pre-theory" of foreign policy and its various 
extensions and tests also quite clearly depart from the pattern by hypothesizing that different 
explanations may hold in different ypes of states. See James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories 
and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Rosenau, ed., The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New 
York: Free Press, 1971), 95-149; James N. Rosenau and Gary Hoggard, "Foreign Policy 
Behavior in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a Pre-Theoretical Extension," in Rosenau, ed., 
Comparing Foreign Policies (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), I17-49; Maurice A. East, 
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Some have asked why nations go to war. Others have dealt with why 
alliances form or dissolve. Possible explanations and effects of arms 
transfers have been analyzed by a third group of researchers. Still others 
have focused on arms races, and so on.4 
Some scholars specialize and focus on one phenomenon or type of 
event because the subject seems to them to have an intrinsic appeal. 
They regard the phenomenon, in and of itself, as a concept; their typical 
goals are to understand its causes or consequences. Other analysts, view- 
ing their chosen empirical behavior or event as an indicator of some 
more overarching concept, reason that an understanding of the phe- 
nomenon will eventually inform them about the concept; examples are 
scholars who focus on war from the perspective of Galtung's structural 
theory of aggression.5 They argue that progress toward an understanding 
of conceptual relationships will come most rapidly if they focus narrowly, 
concentrate on a given empirical phenomenon, and study it in isolation. 
At a minimum, an island of theory will emerge; an area of understanding 
will be established. If, in the meantime, other analysts have been suc- 
cessful in investigating other concrete behaviors and have produced 
islands of their own, it should eventually be possible to go further: the 
"Size and Foreign Policy Behavior," World Politics 25 (July 1973), 556-76. Our contention 
is only that such researchers tend to be the exception rather than the rule. It should also 
be said that a number of analysts report nongeneral findings; e.g., results that hold in the 
i9th century but not in the 20th, or that apply to major powers but not to minor ones. The 
point to note, however, is that the majority of these analysts initially look for-and apparently 
expect to find-general relationships. They have no initial theoretical expectation that their 
model should be applicable to some limited domain or that it should be useful only under 
certain conditions. 
4 For research that adopts a narrow focus on war, see Benjamin A. Most and Harvey 
Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War," American Political 
Science Review 74 (December ig80), 932-46, and Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, 
"Contagion and Border Effects on Contemporary African Conflict," Comparative Political 
Studies i6 (April i983), 92-117. For a study dealing exclusively with alliances, see Brian L. 
Job, "Membership in Inter-Nation Alliances, i815-i965: An Exploration Utilizing Mathe- 
matical Models," in Dina A. Zinnes and John V. Gillespie, eds., Mathematical Models in 
International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1976), 74-iog. For a study focusing exclusively 
on arms races, see Philip A. Schrodt, "Richardson's Model as a Markov Process," ibid., i56- 
75. Research dealing exclusively with international arms transfers is reported by Ilan Peleg, 
"Military Production in Third World Countries," in Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, 
eds., Threats, Weapons and Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, i980), 
209-30. For an analysis focused exclusively on international negotiations, see Glenn H. 
Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1977). Analysts who have written about "islands of theory" in international relations include 
Harold Guetzkow, "Long Range Research in International Relations," American Perspective 
4 (Fall 1950), 421-40, and Nigel Forward, The Field of Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 
5 See, for example, Maurice A. East, "Status Discrepancy and Violence in the International 
System: An Empirical Analysis," in James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and Maurice A. 
East, eds., The Analysis of International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1972), 299-3ig, and 
Michael D. Wallace, War and Rank Among Nations (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 
1973). 
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war island would be linked with other middle-range theories of al- 
liance behavior, arms transfers, defense expenditures, and so on. This 
theoretical synthesis, or bridging of the islands of middle-range theory, 
is expected to provide a more abstract, broad-gauge, or overarching 
understanding of foreign policy and international behavior. 
Empiricalgeneralizations, laws and "always-true" theories. The tendency 
to define puzzles or research questions in terms of particular, concrete 
empirical phenomena and to focus on one but only one type of event 
at a time combines with the fact that most scholars who study foreign 
policy and international relations systematically or scientifically seem to 
think of social laws and theories as being either true or false.6 As we 
have noted previously, the search for empirical generalizations seems to 
have become the sine qua non of at least those scholars who study 
international relations quantitatively. To understand or explain a phe- 
nomenon such as an overt military attack, they consider it necessary to 
identify the factor(s) that, alone or in various combinations, correlate 
with the occurrences of attacks or that seem generally useful according 
to some statistical criterion for postdicting the occurrences of attacks 
in the data set in question. Although a few exceptions may be noted, 
the most common view is that a "good" explanandum is one that is 
generally associated through time or across space with attacks; a "less 
than good" explanandum is one that is not. Research proceeds by iden- 
tifying and retaining the former while rejecting and abandoning the 
latter.7 
On first consideration, these practices seem largely commonsensical. 
They do not seem to be at all problematic. Indeed, the practices are so 
uncontroversial that they are seldom discussed in the current literature. 
Researchers may be led astray, however, if they narrowly focus their 
research on only one type of empirical foreign policy behavior, define 
6 See James S. Coleman, Introduction to Mathematical Sociology (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, i964), 5i6. 
7We are referring here to standard uses of the so-called "general covering law" or 
"refutationist" approach developed by scholars such as Hempel and Popper. For a brief 
rehearsal, see: Gregory A. Raymond, "Introduction: Comparative Analysis and Nomological 
Explanation," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, Robert M. Rood, and Richard 
A. Skinner, eds., International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1975), 41-51. The reasoning underlying this approach 
can be crudely reconstructed in syllogistic form: If a "true" (i.e., universal) law exists between 
some concepts X and Y, then that law should always hold in the empirical world and should 
be evidenced by whatever are the appropriate associations between the respective operational 
indicators of the concepts, xi and yi. Empirical analyses are conducted to test for such 
associations between the occurrences of the xi and yi in the expectation that those results 
will inform us about whether or not a law actually exists between X and Y. The absence 
of the association between the xi and yi allows us, if the reasoning is sound, to reject the 
X/Y law, while the appearance of the anticipated xi/yi relationship allows us to say that the 
data are consistent with, or support the existence of, the X/Y law. 
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problems or potential islands in terms of such concrete phenomena, 
search exclusively for empirical-level generalizations, and equate laws 
with universal truths. 
PROBLEM No. I: 
THE OVERLOOKED POTENTIAL FOR POLICY SUBSTITUTION 
The practices described above are likely to lead to a more abstract 
understanding of why states do what they do only if they do not substitute 
one empirically distinct foreign policy or behavior for another in pursuit 
of their (perhaps heterogeneous) national goals. If foreign policies can 
indeed be alternative routes by which decision makers attain their goals, 
then it would seem plausible that decision makers who are confronted 
with some problem or subjected to some stimulus could, under at least 
certain conditions, substitute one such means for another. If that is the case, 
any factor, stimulus, or problem that triggers ome particular type of 
empirical foreign policy response could, under different conditions, trig- 
ger other, apparently distinct, apparently incommensurable behaviors. If 
the argument is valid, similar factors could lead to distinct concrete or 
empirical foreign policy responses. 
The confounding effects of this potential for foreign policy substi- 
tutability can hardly be overemphasized. For example, Realists have 
argued that states seek the goal of security in the Westphalian self-help 
system. To the extent that states do indeed pursue such a grand or meta- 
conceptual goal (Y), and in principle have a variety of partially substi- 
tutable, alternative means war (yi), alliance formation (y2), arms im- 
portation (y3), arms increases (Y4) for attaining the goal, a given pre- 
sumed causal factor (xi; e.g., an increase in an opponent's arms) could 
logically be expected to explain why the decision makers of a given state 
would be willing to adopt some attempt to resolve the problem, yi. 
Because the stimulus (xi) could be expected to trigger the adoption of 
yi by some decision makers while others might choose different options 
such as y2, y3, ... , yn, however, an understanding of which particular 
yi would be adopted by different decision makers under different con- 
ditions would involve a consideration of how they make comparisons 
across, and eventually choose from, the range of those available options. 
It would require that analysts focus on more than a single type or form 
of foreign policy behavior, rethink the strategy of focusing on particular 
empirical phenomena, and reconsider the construction of middle-range 
islands of theory on the basis of concrete, unabstracted phenomena.8 
8 If yI, y2, . . ., yn are all potential means for attaining an assumed foreign policy goal, 
then each yi is a potentially valid indicator of Y (e.g., the initiation of an overt military 
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Two examples should help to clarify these points. First, let us imagine 
a simple, totally deterministic, world in which the development of a 
"problem" (X) is invariably sufficient-but perhaps not empirically nec- 
essary for an effort o resolve the problem (Y). Wherever and whenever 
X occurs, Y follows. The only complication is that efforts to resolve the 
problem (Y) can take any of three different empirical forms (yI, y2, y3) 
which are not necessarily mutually exclusive (i.e., an actor could respond 
to X by adopting any one or any combination of them). If (i) xi is a 
valid and reliable indicator of X, (2) yI, y2, and y3 are valid and reliable 
complementary indicators of Y. and (3) xi and -xi denote the presence 
or absence of the problem X while yi and -yi denote the presence or 
absence of a given attempt to resolve the problem, the following case 
structures are possible: 
Case i XI yI -y2 -y3 Y 
Case 2 XI -yI Y2 -y3 Y 
Case 3 Xi -yI -y2 Y3 Y 
Case 4 XI YI Y2 Y3 Y 
Case 5 -xI -yI -Y2 -Y3 -Y 
Case 6 -xi YI -Y2 -y3 Y 
Case 7 -xI -Y 3 Y2 -Y3 Y 
Case 8 -xi -YI -Y2 y3 Y 
Analysts who recognize the complementarity of the yi and focus on 
abstract attempts to resolve the problem (Y) rather than on the specific 
empirical forms that such solutions take would not be at all confused 
by this pattern; each time xi appears, Y follows. Because Y also appears 
when xi is not present, however, these analysts would conclude that X, 
as indicated by xi, is sufficient (but not necessary) for Y. Other analysts 
who focus narrowly and specialize in attempts to understand the oc- 
currence of any one and only one-of the concrete yi behaviors would 
run the risk of overlooking the relationship, however; the occurrence 
of xi sometimes but not always precedes any particular yi. In short, 
X, as indicated by xi, would not appear to be sufficient (or necessary) 
for any one of the yi.9 
strike or an increase in defense spending arc complementary indicators of the concept "efforts 
to maintain or enhance security" or "foreign policy means"). Once this is recognized, the 
problem is easily understood: A focus on any one yi fails to provide full coverage of the 
range of possible behaviors in the "means" concept. Analysts who focus on only one yi are 
thus focusing only on "successful" occurrences. To that extent, an examination of the possible 
sufficiency relationship between any presumed causal factor (xi) and the yi is precluded. 
The point here is analogous to our criticism of analysts who focus only on actual occurrences 
of war. See Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "Case Selection, Conceptualization and 
Basic Logic in the Study of War," American Journal of Political Science 26 (November i982), 
834-56, and "Conceptualizing War: Consequences for Theory and Research," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 27 (March I983), 137-59. 
9 The reader may think that researchers could readily resolve this problem by constructing 
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A consideration of the hypothetical interactions among states m, i, 
and j in columns I to 3 in part A of Table i may clarify the problem 
further. The mth state increases its defense spending in each alternative 
round. States i and j respond by increasing their own expenditures (at 
t2), by offering to form an alliance (at t4), by dissolving an alliance or 
seeking foreign arms acquisitions respectively (at t6) and, respectively, 
by seeking to negotiate or attack (at t8). 
Recognizing that the illustration is purely hypothetical and does not 
exhaust the full range of states' possible foreign policy behaviors, the 
basic point should be obvious: the situation would appear chaotic to 
analysts who ignored or overlooked the substitutability potential and 
focused on only a single type of behavior. The typical arms race theorist 
who focuses on reciprocated increases in defense spending would dis- 
cover that increases by one state sometimes do, but sometimes do not, 
lead to similar responses by other states. The alliance theorist would 
discover that an increase in defense spending antedates an effort o form 
an alliance in one instance, but that other such increases precede the 
breakup of an alliance or states' complete inactivity in the alliance sphere. 
The war theorist and the expert on arms transfers would encounter 
similar complexities. Stepped-up defense spending precedes an attack in 
one case but also antedates conciliatory efforts in another; spending 
increases generally do not, but in one case does, appear to lead to an 
effort to import arms. 
Thus, analysts who elect to focus on only one of the behaviors shown 
in the table are likely to be led astray. The strategy would make sense 
only if decision makers of all states responded identically to identical 
stimuli and were unable to substitute. If, however, the behaviors of 
decision makers of different states could in fact take a variety of forms, 
there would be no reason to expect a systematic, sufficient relationship 
between any initial condition and any other specific form of foreign 
policy behavior. To the extent that decision makers have some latitude 
in their choice of options and are sometimes able to substitute one 
alternative for another, a given factor could be expected to lead to, 
stimulate, or 'cause' a variety of empirically distinct foreign policy acts, 
events, or behaviors. 
The substitutability phenomenon, then, provides a possible answer to 
some composite scale of the various yi. In the past, the fashion would have been to factor 
analyze the yi. Such a strategy would work only if it is reasonable to assume that a given 
phenomenon yi invariably indicates the concept Y. As the discussion in the next section 
suggests, such a postulate might not be plausible. While the initiation of conflict may 
sometimes reflect the desire of decision makers to establish (or reestablish) their state's 
external security or viability, for example, the same behavior could reflect their desire to 
increase their government's viability in the face of domestic pressures. 
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TABLE 1 
HYPOTHETICAL ACTION/REACTION PROCESS 
A 
States 
Time m i q 
tl x4 
t2 x4 x4 00 00 
t3 x4 
t4 x5 x5 00 00 
t5 x4 
t6 x6 x7 00 00 
t7 x4 
t8 x8 x9 00 00 
x4: Increase defense spending 
x5: Offer to form an alliance 
x6: Dissolve an alliance with state k 
x7: Seek to import arms 
x8: Seek to negotiate outstanding grievances 
x9: Initiate an attack on the threatening state 
00: No behavior 
B 
States 
Time m i j p q 
tl X2 
t2 X2 X2 00 00 
t3 X2 
t4 X2 X2 00 00 
t5 X2 
t6 X2 X2 00 00 
t7 X2 
t8 X3 X3 00 00 
X2: Increase national defense capacity (C) 
X3: Decrease national defense risk (R) 
00: No behavior 
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C 
States 
Time m p q 
tl X1 
t2 X1 X1 X1 X1 
t3 X1 
t4 X1 X1 X1 X1 
t5 X1 
t6 X1 X1 X1 X1 
t7 X1 
t8 X1 X1 X1 X1 
XI: Decision makers attempt to have C > R 
D 
PERIOD-END STATUS 
States 
Time m I1 q 
tl C>R C<R C<R C<R C>R 
t2 C<R C>R C>R C<R C>R 
t3 C>R C<R C<R C<R C>R 
t4 C<R C>R C>R C<R C>R 
t5 C>R C<R C<R C<R C>R 
t6 C<R C>R C>R C<R C>R 
t7 C>R C<R C<R C<R C>R 
t8 C<R C>R C>R C<R C>R 
the most intriguing of Zinnes's "puzzles." Posing the question, "Do 
nations interact?" she examines the work on arms races an area in 
which substitutability could have important effects and concludes that 
"the overall and overwhelming result is that nations do not interact in 
this domain."Io The few studies that do discover interaction do not focus 
exclusively on armaments but on overall interaction patterns which are 
based on a wide range of hostile/cooperative events. 
Although a thorough understanding of the best apparent solution to 
this difficulty must await the consideration of a few additional points, 
1o Dina A. Zinnes, "Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher," International Studies Quar- 
terly 24 (September i980), 315-42, at 323 (emphasis in original). 
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its basic outlines can be traced. If scholars are genuinely interested in 
understanding why states do what they do, they need to move beyond 
efforts to focus separately on particular concrete behaviors. Rather than 
asking middle-range questions about specific empirical phenomena, they 
should begin with the initial "grand" question with which they were 
allegedly concerned in the first place; rather than asking why states arm, 
form alliances, import arms, negotiate, attack, and so on, they should 
begin by asking what each behavior does, or at least could, represent. 
Thus, we need to return to the more generic onceptualizations, such 
as "response to threat" or "response to uncertainty under the West- 
phalian security dilemma," that appeared in the traditional literature 
under the rubric of "security," "national interest," or "balance of power." 
A whole range of activities that are currently discussed under headings 
such as trade, aid, international aw, regimes, international organization, 
and so on, could be conceptualized more broadly as "adaptation for 
coordination or collaboration" or some similarly overarching concept. 
The point to be emphasized, however, is the need to reconceptualize 
exactly what it is that we want to study, and why. Students of international 
relations have, in many cases, actually reified the operational indicators 
of international interaction. We have studied war qua war, alliances qua 
alliances, and have tended to overlook the broader international processes 
and phenomena that such specific forms of behavior represent. 
The results of this narrowness have been recognized in recent reviews 
of the alliance literature by Ward and Job." Both authors note that there 
has been little cumulation or theoretical development. Both conclude 
that alliance research is focused too narrowly and rather unfruitfully 
on questions such as the alliance/war relationship. While neither calls 
explicitly for reconceptual efforts, both suggest that the time may have 
come to move beyond the study of alliances per se and efforts to develop 
alliance theory. Job in particular seems to recommend asking what 
alliances do (or under certain conceptualizations, could) "really" rep- 
resent. 12 
-- Michael Don Ward, "Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics: Literature Review," mimeo. 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University, i980), and Brian L. Job, "Grins Without Cats: In 
Pursuit of Knowledge of International Alliances," in P. Terrence Hopmann, Dina A. Zinnes, 
and J. David Singer, eds., Cumulation in International Relations Research, Monograph Series 
in World Affairs, Vol. i8, Book 3 (Graduate School of International Studies, University of 
Denver, 198I). 
1 The need to reverse the tendency to attack international and foreign policy phenomena 
in fragmented, piecemeal fashion can be defended on other grounds. The point has been 
tellingly made by both Ostrom and Boynton. See Elinor Ostrom, "Beyond Positivism: An 
Introduction to This Volume," in Ostrom, ed., Strategies of Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills, 
Calif.: Sage Publications, i982), 11-28, and G. Robert Boynton, "Linking Problem Definition 
and Research Activities: Using Formal Languages," in Judith A. Gillespie and Dina A. 
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The beginnings of one such unifying formulation are shown in Table 
2. The "image" is one of value-maximizing decision makers who per- 
ceive themselves to be confronted with a security dilemma. A perceived 
imbalance in the Capacity-to-Risk inequality (i.e., C 6 R) acts as the 
motive force; given an imbalance, decision makers are inclined or "will- 
ing" to attempt o reverse it by adopting some policy initiative that is 
likely to increase their defense capacity or decrease their risks. This 
"probable" behavior is expected to interact with what is "possible."'3 
Put simply, decision makers will be constrained by the range of available 
policy options; they will adopt a given policy alternative if, and only if, 
they have both the "willingness" and the "opportunity" to do so.'4 
Assuming for the moment hat the axioms in Table 2 apply to states 
m, i, and j, that each state has unlimited implementation capability or 
opportunities to act, and that m views i andj as risks while i and j view 
m-but not each other-as possible sources of danger, the interactions 
among states m, i, andj in part A of Table i begin to become intelligible. 
The apparently diverse behaviors and acts become commensurable. If 
the formulation and the just-mentioned auxiliary conditions had been 
Zinnes, eds., Missing Elements in Political Inquiry (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 
I982), 43-60. Perhaps J. Bronowski, however, puts the point most clearly: 
All science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses. . . . The scientist looks for order 
in appearances of nature by exploring such likenesses. For order does not display itself; 
if it can be said to be there at all, it is not there for the mere looking. There is no 
way of pointing a finger or a camera at it; order must be discovered and, in a deep 
sense, it must be created. What we see, as we see it, is mere disorder.... [Full grown] 
science grows from a comparison. It has seized a likeness between two unlike ap- 
pearances. . . The progress of science is the discovery at each step of a new order 
which gives unity to what seemed unlike (Bronowski, Science and Human Values [New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, i965], 13-15). 
3 Harold and Margaret Sprout, An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of International 
Politics, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 30 
(Princeton, 1968), and Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study 
of International Politics," in James N. Roseneau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, 
rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, i969), 41-56. 
14 The careful reader will note that major elements of "Realism" and the "security 
dilemma" are being formalized in Table 2. See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); Robert Jervis, "Cooperation 
Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January 1978), i67-214, and Robert 0. 
Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" (Paper presented at 
the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Denver, i982). These 
elements are being formalized around an expected utility framework that draws on the 
"cognitive behaviorism" of the Sprouts (fn. 13) in a manner eschewed by Realist theorists. 
While the model is somewhat similar to the Realist approach, therefore, it is also consistent 
with the Sprouts' dictum regarding environmental determinism: i.e., motivating factors need 
to be mapped through decision makers' perceptions even if all decision makers perceive 
alike and they do not make a (statistical) difference. Mapping through the decision makers 
is a logical requirement, not a statistical concern; nothing would happen (no relationships 
would hold) if decision makers did not exist. (We depart from Sprout and Sprout, however, 
insofar as we see policy initiations as "outcomes" of the interplay between what decision 
makers want to do and are capable of doing.) 
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TABLE 2 
A UNIFIED ACTOR/NATIONAL SECURITY DILEMMA FORMULATION 
Axiom 1: The decision makers of an nth state are, or can be treated as, 
unified and value-maximizing actors who possess perfect information re- 
garding all options and their consequences. 
Axiom 2: At any given point in time, the decision makers in an nth state 
perceive that they have a certain national defense capacity (Cnt) and are 
confronted by some degree of national risk or vulnerability (Rnt).a 
Axiom 3: The decision makers of an nth state are motivated or willing to 
establish the following inequality: 
Cnt > Rnt 
i.e., the decision makers want to be unconditionally viable and main- 
tain at least local supremacy. 
Postulate 1: Only if the decision makers of an nth state command the 
necessary objective capability or opportunity (0) to adopt some unilateral 
policy initiative, then the adoption of that initiative. 
Postulate 2: If the decision makers of an nth state perceive that their state's 
defense capacity has been neglected or allowed to deteriorate between tO 
and tI, they will perceive that CntO > Cntl. 
Postulate 3: If a given state increases its national defense capacity between 
tO and tl and the decision makers in an nth state perceive that action as a 
threat, they will perceive that RntO < Rntl. 
Postulate 4: If Cntl < Rntl, then the decision makers of the nth state will 
be motivated to adopt some policy initiative designed to increase Cn and/ 
or decrease Rn at t2; i.e., if the decision makers perceive that they are only 
conditionally viable at ti, then they will be willing to increase their capac- 
ities or decrease their risks. 
Postulate 5: If, and only if, the decision makers of an nth state command 
the necessary capacity (or opportunity) to adopt some unilateral policy 
initiative and they are motivated (or willing) to do so, then the adoption 
of that initiative. 
aGiven the purpose of the illustration, it is not important to consider how one might 
operationalize either Cnt or Rnt. Only three points need to be noted. First, it should be 
understood that both capacities (C) and risks (R) are conceptualized here in terms of 
decision makers' perceptions. Put simply, a state's defense capacities and the risks it con- 
fronts are as they are recognized and understood by the decision makers. Consistent with 
this conceptualization, the capacities of "friendly" or distant states may be discounted by 
an nth state's decision makers in their calculation of Rnt; similarly, the capacities of friendly, 
and especially allied, states could be counted by the nth state's decision makers as supple- 
mental sources of Cnt. Finally, it should be clear that capacities (C) and risks (R) may 
differ from the decision makers' objective capabilities or opportunities (see Postulate 1), 
which affect policy initiatives regardless of whether or not they are (accurately) perceived 
by the decision makers. 
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in place at the outset, it would have been possible to deduce that each 
state would adopt some measure to increase capacity (C) or decrease risk 
(R) in each successive round (see part B of Table i). Each of these 
concepts would have brought together a number of hitherto apparently 
diverse behaviors. Within the context of the model, increases in defense 
expenditures, offers of alliance, and efforts to import arms could have 
been seen as commensurable; they could have been recognized as al- 
ternative indicators of decision makers' efforts to increase their defense 
capacity. Alliance dissolutions, offers to negotiate, and military strikes 
could also have been rendered commensurable as efforts to decrease 
risk. It would have been possible to go further; efforts to increase capacity 
or decrease risk-along with the distinct empirical behaviors that each 
embraces within the formulation-could have been linked in turn to 
decision makers' efforts to manage their respective C-to-R inequalities 
(see part C of Table i). 
With all of this in mind, consider the behaviors of nations p and q 
in columns 4 and 5 of Table i above. While states m, i, andj display a 
wide range of behaviors-presumably in an effort to manipulate their 
Capacity-to-Risk ratios-p and q remain completely inactive. Viewed 
at the raw empirical level, there appears to be no consistency whatsoever 
in the actions of the five states. Each responds differently. Even for 
analysts who recognize the underlying unity of the actions of the first 
three states, the behaviors ofp and q would probably appear to be distinct 
departures from the expected pattern. While the acts of nations m, i, 
andj are consistent with the postulate that the decision makers in those 
nations perceive a security problem and are therefore undertaking policy 
initiatives to increase their defense capabilities or decrease their risks, p 
and q appear to behave quite differently. They do nothing at all; the 
conceptualization does not seem to apply. 
The point to be noted, however, is that states p and q could be 
imbedded in the pattern if one began with the model in Table 2 and 
also knew the following: (i) The decision makers of p view m as a 
potential threat that upsets their C-to-R ratio throughout the sequence, 
but they lack the capability to undertake any action to reset the inequality 
(see Postulates i and 5 in Table 2); (2) the decision makers of q do not 
perceive the acts of any of the other states as threatening, perhaps because 
they are distant from or ideologically allied to them (see Postulate 3). 
Given these auxiliary conditions, one would expect the empirical be- 
havioral patterns of p and q to appear distinct from those of states m, 
i, and j. While the latter three would be expected to increase their 
defense capacities or decrease their risks if the model were "true," p 
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would remain inactive because its decision makers' willingness to act 
would be frustrated by lack of capability, while q would remain inactive 
because it simply is not motivated to act. The acts of all five states m, 
i,}, p, and q in Table I are in fact consistent with the postulate that 
decision makers are operating to establish favorable Capacity-to-Risk 
inequalities.'5 
These observations raise an important point that is generally over- 
looked: correlations and other such associations may not exist among 
empirical indicators imply because a given process is operating. If the 
security dilemma formulation shown in Table 2 were "true," states could 
reasonably be expected to behave differently. The relationships among 
the theoretical concepts could be general, but even if that were the case, 
the outcomes of the decision processes of different s ates could be rather 
heterogeneous. Again, if the model were "true," different empirical 
behaviors could follow. 
PROBLEM No. 2: 
THE OVERLOOKED POSSIBILITIES OF ALTERNATIVE TRIGGERS AND 
SOMETIMES TRUE LAWS 
The problem created by the potential for foreign policy substitutability 
is exacerbated by the practice among analysts of equating laws, theories, 
and models with universal--or at least highly generalizable-empirical 
"truths." At one level, this problem arises because the operation of even 
universal aws may not invariably be evident empirically. Scholars al- 
ready recognize some of the reasons why this could be the case.'6 Our 
concern here is with a more fundamental-and generally overlooked- 
possibility. Put simply, analysts may be led astray when they associate 
'5Another reason why states p and q are of interest derives from the so-called "empty 
cell" problem. Instead of ignoring the "nonbehaviors" of actors (the zeros or empty cells in 
data matrices), analysts might attempt to utilize the important information conveyed by 
such nonbehaviors when they construct and evaluate their models. For an empirical example 
of this phenomenon in which "neutral" war behavior plays the key role in model structure 
and evaluation, see Dina A. Zinnes and others, "From War to War: A Stochastic Model 
of Alignment Behavior" (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the International 
Studies Association, Philadelphia, I98I). 
,6 Even though a universal or "true" relationship may exist, for example, difficulties with 
indicator validity and reliability could mask that association at the empirical level. In our 
own earlier work, we have suggested that additional complications may develop as a result 
of faulty case selection procedures or the failure to specify the correct logical linkages among 
the concepts and indicators (see fn. 8). Those problems are critical. They raise doubts about 
the standard approach (see fn. 7). To the extent that such difficulties exist, or at least cannot 
be ruled out, the results of the tests become ambiguous. The lack of empirical support in 
a given analysis could indeed imply that a supposed law is not true, but it could also mean 
that operation of a true law is obscured by the procedures adopted by the researcher 
conducting the test. 
FOREIGN POLICY SUBSTITUTABILITY 397 
laws and theories with questions of universal truth or empirical gen- 
eralizations because a given phenomenon may occur for a variety of 
distinct, totally incommensurable, reasons. 
Just as the possibility of foreign policy substitution suggests that a 
given factor may lead to different results (a one-to-many mapping), the 
logical reverse is also imaginable. Different processes may lead to similar 
results; different factors may trigger similar responses (a many-to-one 
mapping). If policy makers can use different options in their pursuit of 
similar goals (i.e., substitute), they can also adopt identical options for 
different reasons, or employ similar means to pursue different goals.'7 
One aspect of the alternative trigger problem is implicit in part A of 
Table i above; in this guise, at least, the difficulty is easily circumvented 
by employing existing procedures. As we showed in that illustration, 
the mth state's increases in each round could plausibly be expected to 
lead to different responses by the ith andjth states; in a process of foreign 
policy substitution, a given trigger could lead to different empirical 
reactions. The point to be noted here is that even though the mth state 
elects to increase its defense spending in each round, we should not 
necessarily expect to find any single empirical trigger for the selection 
of that option. If we assume that the leaders of the mth state are con- 
cerned with their country's ecurity situation, then increases in defense 
spending by i and j, the formation of an alliance between them, the 
dissolution of an alliance, efforts by j to import arms, and certainly 
attacks by theljth state should all be expected to contribute to decisions 
by leaders of the mth state to increase defense capabilities. 
A second aspect of the alternative trigger problem is perhaps more 
important; in this form, the difficulty is less easily resolved. Let us 
imagine a world that comprises two sets of cases: those characterized 
by condition A and those that are not, i.e., a world in which there are 
7Bruce Bueno de Mesquita appears to have exactly this problem in mind when he 
considers research on the outbreak of war and observes, 
... the set of conditions sufficient for war may be so large that its specification is 
virtually impossible.... Most efforts to find the cause or causes of war focus on 
environmental circumstances that compel policymakers to wage war, but if we attempt 
to show causal relationships between environments and war, we are forced to ignore 
the role of national leaders and to act as though nations were no more than automatically 
reacting mechanisms (Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap [New Haven: Yale University 
Press, I98I], 4-5). 
It is this line of argument-combined with his contention that decision makers are not 
mechanistically compelled-that leads Bueno de Mesquita to conclude that the search for 
the sufficient conditions for war should be abandoned in favor of a search for necessary 
conditions. A similar position is suggested by Singer (fn. i). Other related points are con- 
tributed by James R. Kurth, "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Pro- 
curement," Public Policy i9 (Summer I971), 373-404; and, Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, General 
Systems Theory (New York: Braziller, i968). 
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A and -A cases. Presume that type A case are those in which decision 
makers are concerned with maintaining their states' national security, 
while decision makers in -A polities pursue other goals. Imagine further 
that within the set of A cases, the development of an external risk (X 
or any xi) is invariably sufficient for an effort to resolve the security 
problem (Y), but external risk is not necessary for efforts to resolve the 
security problem because leaders are also concerned with through-time 
deteriorations in their defense capacities. Within the set of A states, Y 
follows wherever and whenever X (or any xi) occurs, but Y sometimes 
occurs in the absence of X (or all xi). By contrast, when A is not present, 
X (and the xi) do not lead to Y, and Y sometimes occurs in the absence 
of X (or all xi)."8 Finally, let us make the usual presumptions regarding 
the validity and reliability of the indicators and consider the following 
possible case structure:' 
Case i A xi -X2 -x3 X Y 
Case 2 A -xi X2 -x3 X Y 
Case 3 A -xi -X2 x3 X Y 
Case 4 A xi X2 x3 X Y 
Case 5 A -xi -X2 -x3 -X Y 
Case 6 A -xi -X2 -x3 -X Y 
Case 7 A -xi -X2 -x3 -X Y 
Case 8 A -xi -X2 -x3 -X Y 
Case 9 -A xi -X2 -x3 X -Y 
Case io -A -xi X2 -x3 X -Y 
Case ii -A -xi -X2 x3 X -Y 
Case I2 -A xi X2 x3 X -Y 
Case 13 -A -xi -X2 -X2 -X Y 
Case I4 -A -xi -X2 -x3 -X Y 
Case I5 -A -xi -X2 -x3 -X Y 
Case i6 -A -xi -X2 -x3 -X Y 
8 Expressed simply, the hypothesis of the form, "Given A, if X (or any xi), then Y (or 
any yi"; i.e., given A, X is sufficient, but not necessary, for Y. If A were a measured variable 
rather than a theoretical postulate or axiom which is presumed to be either true or untrue, 
the proposition could be rewritten: "If A and X (or any xi), then Y (or any yi); i.e., A and 
X are jointly sufficient for Y." Seen in this fashion, axioms are simply dichotomous variables 
that analysts either choose or are forced to leave unmeasured. This suggests that axioms 
should in general not be viewed as assertions of universal truth. They should instead be 
seen as antecedents incomplex "if... , then . . ." statements which, in collapsed form, would 
read: "If the specified axioms are true for a given case, then the model should apply." Once 
this is seen, we can move quickly beyond debates over the universal truth or falsity of the 
assumptions themselves: the question of the truth or falsity of the model is put aside. We 
can even move beyond concerns for generality and become more directly concerned with 
(a) identifying cases in which the axioms are true and in which the model should therefore 
be useful, and (b) developing complementary models that hold under alternative sets of 
initial axioms. 
9 It is perhaps worth noting that this illustration entails an important simplifying as- 
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Even for those analysts who recognize both the substitutability prob- 
lem and the first type of alternative trigger problem and therefore lect 
to focus on Y and X rather than exclusively on the occurrence of any 
one of the yi or xi, interpretation of the pattern would not be a simple 
matter if they ignored the A/-A bifurcation of the set of cases and were 
concerned only with the X/Y relationship. Put simply, application of the 
standard procedures would lead them either to reject the hypothesis that 
X generally leads to Y or to underestimate the importance of that linkage. 
Within the domain circumscribed by the presence of A (cases i to 8 
above), however, X is sufficient for Y. Outside that domain, X does not 
lead to Y (cases 9 to i6). The occurrences of Y in the -A domain must 
be triggered by something else. Knowing about X or any xi does not 
help. 
That said, however, the point should be clear. While the X/Y hy- 
pothesis is not general, it is nevertheless a perfectly sound indeed, even 
"lawlike"- proposition within its domain of applicability (the cases in 
set A). Although ultimately we should like to develop an explanation 
that applies to all sixteen of the cases above, no additional work-either 
theoretical or empirical-is necessary to account for the first eight. 
Thus, there are two different ways to approach the cases above. One 
is to develop and test hypotheses that are expected at the outset to be 
general or applicable to the universe of cases. Such a method would be 
consistent with current practices and the standard approach in which 
generalizations are found by aiming directly at them. Unfortunately, 
that strategy seems to reduce to an all-or-nothing situation in which we 
are forced to play to weakness; to explain completely any occurrence of 
a phenomenon, we must account for all occurrences. 
The other strategy is to develop and test hypotheses that are expected 
to hold only under certain conditions (e.g., A or -A; when decision 
makers seek to maintain their national security, and when they do not). 
Although we are ultimately interested in accounting for all occurrences 
of a phenomenon, the immediate (somewhat counterintuitive) strategy 
would entail an initial consideration of what relationships should hold 
when, and a focus on only those cases in which the conditions pertain. 
Once those occurrences were explained, we could move on, perhaps 
developing very different models that would be applicable to the other 
sumption: states have the opportunity to act whenever they are willing to do so. Under the 
unified actor/national security dilemma formulation outlined in Table 2, we would expect 
either increasing external risks or decreasing defense capacity to contribute to the leaders' 
willingness to resolve the security problem if the change in either factor is sufficient o 
reverse previously positive Capacity-to-Risk inequalities. Whether or not the decision makers 
would act on that disposition, however, would be affected by their objective opportunities 
to act. 
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cases. This domain-specific theory approach would thus let us play to 
strength; rather than having to account for the phenomenon Y both 
when decision makers are and are not concerned with their states' 
security dilemmas, we could conclude that there are occurrences that 
are explicable (i.e., those in the A set) and others whose explanation 
requires more theoretical and empirical research (i.e., those in the -A 
set). Rather than resting progress on the isolation of one explanation 
that holds for all, this approach allows us to move ahead by identifying 
an explanation that holds for some. 
Let us consider now the unified actor/security dilemma formulation 
discussed above (see Table 2). Among other things, that model specifies 
that decision makers are motivated to establish the inequality expressed 
in Axiom 3: Cnt > Rnt. It suggests that decision makers want their states 
to be unconditionally viable; it would be consistent with their attempts 
to maintain at least local supremacy.20 
If we presume for the purpose of argument that at least some decision 
makers in at least some settings do in fact key their decisions to that 
inequality, we come up against an obvious problem. With very little in 
the way of data analysis, we know that there are (or in principle, could 
be) states that act to increase their defense capabilities and decrease their 
risks at given times even though they have already so clearly satisfied 
the inequality and established their unconditional viability that the acts 
of other states do not reverse it. Because such states have already attained 
their goal, the motivation that presumably drives decision makers is lost; 
the antecedent condition in Postulate 4 (i.e., the condition Cnt, < Rnt,) 
would simply never be established. Even though the model would there- 
fore be adequate for accounting for the behaviors of states such as m, 
i, andj in Table I, it would leave totally unexplained the behaviors of 
states that are already convincingly viable. 
Still assuming, then, that the formulation in Table i is useful for 
accounting for the decisions of some states, but also concluding that it 
could not logically be expected to account for the decisions of all polities, 
we are in a difficult situation if the goal is to discover a single, general 
formulation that applies to all cases both through time and across space. 
Even though the axioms of the model might be valid for some cases 
and the model's postulates might always hold within that domain, cur- 
rent practices would lead us to reject the model because neither it nor 
the relationships it implies are universally "true." Put more squarely, a 
model that might be perfectly adequate for explaining what happens in 
20 See Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper Torchbooks, i962). 
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some well-defined cases might be abandoned because it does not always 
apply or help to explain all cases. 
The importance of this point becomes more apparent once we rec- 
ognize that a variety of other motive assumptions could be postulated 
to characterize decision-making processes. One such possibility would 
be a variation on the national-security model in Table 2; rather than 
attempting to establish the Cnt > Rnt inequality, decision makers could 
be posited as seeking the maintenance of the status quo so that the 
Capacity-to-Risk ratio at any time is at least equal to that of an earlier 
period. (Such a modified national-security formulation might be appli- 
cable to states that continue to increase their defense capacity and reduce 
the threat engendered by their opponents even though they are already 
unconditionally viable; it might be consistent with the illusory quest for 
perfect security or with the security dilemma of never knowing how 
much capability is enough.) In contrast to such national-security moti- 
vations, one could posit "domestic" viability models in which decision 
makers seek either to maintain enough political strength to keep from 
being deposed by their domestic opposition or to maintain at least their 
prior position vis-a-vis domestic threats. Other goals, and indeed com- 
binations of several goals, could also be presented; any one of them 
could provide a rationale for expecting that decision makers might 
increase their military expenditures, create alliances, dissolve them, im- 
port arms, open negotiations, launch preemptive military strikes, and so 
on. Different processes, including a number that depart from an as- 
sumption of unified, value-maximizing decision makers, could lead to 
similar results. 
A consideration of such alternative formulations uggests several im- 
portant points. First, there is the partitioning role of axioms. Although 
there are probably some actual cases in which decision makers pursue 
almost any goal that one might reasonably wish to posit, there may also 
be instances in which decision makers are motivated by other concerns. 
To the extent that this seems plausible, such alternative motive forces 
or goals would not in any sense constitute the bases for rival or competing 
models. To be sure, one of the motive assumptions might be true for 
more cases than the others. If so, the formulation appropriate to that 
axiom would be more useful than the other models. The point, however, 
is that it would probably not be plausible to argue that any one of the 
motive axioms is always true. Thus, it would not be reasonable to expect 
any of the models to be universally applicable. We would therefore not 
be inclined to conduct a critical test in order to discover which is the 
more general. Instead, we would be interested in exploring whether or 
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not a given model applies to a given, well-defined case or set of cases. 
Second, if different processes do indeed lead to similar concrete em- 
pirical behaviors, the concept reflected by one such act could be different 
within different formulations. If the decision makers are dealing with 
a national viability or security dilemma, for example, an increase in their 
defense expenditures or the formation of an alliance would be inter- 
pretable as-and more importantly, serve as an indicator of-efforts to 
increase their state's defense capacity or to decrease the foreign risks 
with which they perceive it to be confronted; if they are seeking to 
resolve a simple governmental viability problem, on the other hand, 
those same acts would reflect efforts to increase their government's 
strength or to decrease the degree to which it is threatened by domestic 
forces. Even though analysts may tend to view acts as inherently or 
intrinsically falling on some fixed scale between conflict and cooperation, 
or between friendly and hostile behaviors, therefore, it might make more 
sense to interpret the actions of decision makers in the context of what 
they are attempting to accomplish. 
Third, and perhaps most important, the argument suggests that it 
may be useful to expect that true social laws may not always hold, operate, 
or apply empirically. There may well be a variety of social laws, each 
of which is true, but which should be expected to hold only under 
certain-perhaps very special-conditions. Although it is possible that 
universal, always true, laws exist and we believe that scholars should 
continue their efforts to identify them, it is difficult to think of very 
many empirical universals that have been identified even by physical 
scientists. Thus, it may be useful to recognize that there could very well 
be laws that are in some sense "good," "domain-specific," or "nice," 
even though the relationships they imply are not necessarily empirically 
general.21 Rather than assuming that there need be a single "always 
true" law that accounts for a given phenomenon whenever and wherever 
it has occurred or will occur, it may be more productive to think of 
several laws, each of which is always true under certain conditions (or 
within certain domains), but which is only sometimes true empirically 
because those conditions do not always hold in the empirical world. It 
might be more profitable to distinguish between the truthfulness of a 
relationship and the question of whether or not it holds in a given 
instance. Although the identification of universal relationships is still a 
2 Technically, it is not necessary to use words and phrases such as "domain-specific" or 
nice in connection with laws. They are used here only to emphasize our point that analysts 
may err if they necessarily equate laws with universals (see fn. 22 below). The adjective 
"nice" is used in similar fashion by G. Robert Boynton, "On Getting from Here to There: 
Reflections on Two Paradigms and Other Things," in Ostrom (fn. i2), 29-68. 
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worthwhile goal, it may be useful to consider other research objectives 
that are equally important and perhaps more attainable.22 
Ultimately, of course, analysts may develop several models, each of 
which may serve to explain a given phenomenon under different con- 
ditions. When that occurs when we understand why Y occurs in both 
the A and -A domains it may be possible to integrate or synthesize 
those islands of understanding. In the interim, however, we should play 
to strength; we should learn not to reject or disregard an explanation 
that is only sometimes true. 
SOME CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Cumulation and theory. In recent years, James N. Rosenau has become 
concerned with integrative cumulation and theory building in inter- 
22 Because the points depart so sharply from accepted arguments and assumptions, it may 
be worthwhile to consider the following observations from scholars who use somewhat 
different erms, but come to identical conclusions: 
There is a widespread misconception that theories are either "true" or "false." A 
number of examples in physical science stand in direct contradiction to this. . .. Each 
of these theories or models is tautologically true, when their postulates are fulfilled.... 
They are not theories to be confirmed or disconfirmed in general, but only confirmed 
or disconfirmed in specific applications. As a result, they are not theories which explain 
"how people behave"; they are theories or models which describe how people behaved 
in this or that circumstance .. . one fruitful line of development . . . will be not to ask 
what is the theory of a certain kind of behavior, or what are the postulates which 
correctly describe a general area of behavior. The tactic proposed here is to set about 
developing and applying a number of sometimes-true theories which relate conse- 
quences to postulates, and which may adequately describe behavior in a given situation 
(Coleman [fn. 6], 5i6-i8; emphasis in original). 
... the laws of mathematics were invented too. The only demand made on them is 
that of consistency in a given context. But in different contexts, different laws may operate. 
Therefore, any statement of mathematics is valid or invalid not because certain relations 
are true or not true in the real world, but because these statements are or are not 
consequences of certain definitions and assumptions, which we are free to choose. The 
ambiguity of a mathematical statement results from a failure to specify with sufficient 
precision the exact context in which the statement is made (Anatol Rapoport, Fights, 
Games and Debates [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, i960], 297-98; emphasis 
added). 
Laws of nature . . . are different: to them the words "true," "probable" and the like 
seem to have no application. ... [We could] adopt Snell's formula tentatively, hypo- 
thetically, as a guide to further experiments to see whether the phenomena always 
happen so. On this level, we might ask "Is Snell's hypothesis true or false?" meaning, 
"Have any limitations been found to the application of his formula?" But very soon- 
indeed as soon as its fruitfulness has been established-the formula in our hypothesis 
comes to be treated as a law, i.e., as something of which we ask not "Is it true?" but 
"When does it hold?" When this happens, it becomes part of the framework of optical 
theory, and is treated as a standard. Departures from the law and limitations on its 
scope ... come to be spoken of as anomalies and thought of as things in need of 
explanation (Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction [New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, I953], 78-79; emphasis in original). 
Similar points have been made by Boynton (fns. I2 and 2i), and Ostrom (fn. I2) and 
"Introduction: Making Sense Out of a Muddle," in Gillespie and Zinnes (fn. I2), 37-4I. 
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national relations. Perceived lack of progress in this area has prompted 
Dina Zinnes to inquire about why there has apparently been so little 
cumulation. Hopmann, Zinnes, and Singer have noted the need to as- 
semble diverse pieces of evidence. Other analysts have considered the 
unconnected nature of the existing islands of theory and called for their 
integration.23 
Our discussion has attempted to delineate a particular impediment 
to cumulation: The generalfailure to conceptualize questions and indicators 
broadly enough to capture the relationships and processes that scholars are 
actually interested in studying. We have argued that the islands of theory 
extant in the international relations literature have been too narrowly 
conceived for answering the questions that have been asked; we have 
suggested that analysts' ways of theorizing and perhaps even their 
expectations about the results of such efforts may have been inappro- 
priate for dealing with the problems at hand. Analysts have lost their 
perspective, perhaps as a consequence of the abandonment of grand 
theory, their efforts to develop middle-range formulations, or their adop- 
tion of the even narrower hypothesis-testing procedures that were fos- 
tered by the empirical "third wave" of the i96os and 1970s. 
We have offered a number of specific recommendations about what 
should be done. Two remedies should be reemphasized. First, scholars 
should endeavor to merge the rigor and systematization of scientific 
inquiry with the broader, grand theoretical conceptualizations of the 
traditional literature in which substitutability and domain-specific laws 
were at least implicitly recognized. Second, analysts should begin to pay 
more careful attention to basic epistemological issues.24 Nothing we have 
said casts doubt on existing research practices or suggests they should 
be abandoned. Our point is only that those practices, drawn as they are 
from other disciplines that are concerned with other types of problems, 
should be utilized with circumspection. Even though scholars are often 
impatient with epistemological issues and find themselves anxious to get 
on with their analyses, they should bear in mind that how they approach 
their problems the manner in which they conceptualize them and the 
23Rosenau, ed., In Search of Global Patterns (New York: The Free Press, I973), Hopmann 
and others (fn. ii), and Zinnes (fn. io). Scholars such as Singer and Russett have argued 
that analysts' collective research efforts are beginning to add up: J. David Singer (fn. I), 
and Singer, "Tribal Sins on the QIP Reservation," in Rosenau (above), i67-73, and Bruce 
M. Russett, "International Interactions and International Processes: The State of the Dis- 
cipline" (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Asso- 
ciation, Denver, i982). 
24 A similar point has been made recently in Bueno de Mesquita (fn. I7) and "Theories 
of International Conflict: An Analysis and an Appraisal," in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook 
of Political Conflict (New York: The Free Press, I980), 36i-98. 
FOREIGN POLICY SUBSTITUTABILITY 405 
methods they utilize in their attempts to solve them-will ultimately 
impinge on their results. If apparently distinct foreign policies could be 
responses to similar problems as a result of substitutability, and similar 
foreign policies could be responses to different problems as a result of 
the operation of domain-specific laws, then we may need to rethink the 
accepted procedures. 
Microlevel decisional analysis and process. We have tried to do more 
than issue yet another call for theory, for more fruitful merging of 
tradition and science, or for greater attention to the implications of our 
methods. As in our other work, we have suggested here that a particular 
type of theoretical development might be especially useful. Following 
Theodore Abel, and using the work of the Sprouts as a starting point, 
both "opportunity" and "willingness" are posited as fundamental con- 
siderations.25 Each state's objective opportunities circumscribe the range 
of possible acts and behaviors available to its decision makers. In the 
terms of Russett and Starr, the opportunities ofstates define their "menus 
for choice."26 Because the factors that create or preclude different options 
are differentially distributed across states and even within states through 
time, such concerns are in some sense likely to be important for un- 
derstanding their policy undertakings. A focus on such attributes could 
provide insights into the basic parameters or limits of the foreign policies 
of different countries. 
To the extent hat analysts are less interested in the parameters within 
which states operate and are ultimately more concerned with under- 
standing why certain options are adopted at particular times, however, 
our contention is that a focus on the attributes of states will not suffice. 
In this, we agree with Waltz that 
... different states have produced similar as well as different outcomes, 
and similar states have produced different as well as similar outcomes. 
The same causes sometimes lead to different effects, and the same effects 
sometimes follow from different causes.27 
Expressed in our terms, it appears that a focus on attributes could tell 
us what states can do, and therefore possibly what the aggregate prob- 
abilities are that certain types of events will occur in a given group or 
sample of states. A focus on attributes cannot tell us, however, which 
particular states will do what, or when they will do it. Certain objective 
25Abel, "The Element of Decision in the Pattern of War," American Sociological Review 
6 (December I941), 853-59; Sprout and Sprout (fn. I3). 
26 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu For Choice (San Francisco: 
W. H. Freeman, i98i). 
27 Waltz (fn. I), 37- 
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capabilities may be necessary for a foreign policy initiation, but they 
should not be expected to be sufficient for that undertaking unless, that 
is, decision makers are homogeneously willing to avail themselves of all 
their opportunities. The problem is that it does not seem reasonable to 
expect all foreign policy makers in all states to pursue identical goals.28 
It is the recognition of this problem that leads Waltz to reject "re- 
ductionist" or "analytic" theories focused on the individual, decisional, 
or national levels of analysis, and to argue instead for a systemic ap- 
proach.29 While we agree with Waltz and other systems-level theorists 
on the problem, and also conclude that static analyses of the attributes 
of states will not bring progress, our own solution is quite different. We 
argue that, while the objective capabilities of states may define the range 
of possibilities, progress can be made by understanding the processes by 
which decision makers choose certain options over others. This suggests 
that we might usefully follow Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility 
approach3o and study how decision makers select from among varying 
sets of available, potentially substitutable alternatives, paying particular 
attention to the cognitive or perceptual processes that we couch in terms 
of "willingness," and that the Sprouts cast in terms of "cognitive be- 
haviorism."3' Put differently, we need to consider how the willingness 
and opportunities of states interact o produce foreign policy behaviors. 
28 Singer, himself a long-time proponent of the systemic level approach and the view that 
foreign policy decision makers may at least initially be presumed to be rather homogeneous, 
comes close to this point in reviewing the realpolitik, arms race, power transition, economic 
development, and imperialism models: 
... at rock bottom the most important difference amongst the contending causes of 
war models is that of the foreign policy decision process. That is, each model assumes- 
often implicitly-a different class of decision makers in power and each postulates a 
different set of decision rules. . .. Note that we have assumed, to this juncture, a high 
degree of homogeneity in decision makers and the rules they employ, but to move 
closer to a full explanation, that assumption would have to be relaxed (Singer [fn. I], I4- 
I5, emphasis added). 
See also J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in 
Rosenau (fn. I3), 20-29. 
29 Waltz (fn. I), esp. pp. 37 and 65. 
3 Bueno de Mesquita (fn. I7). 
3 One critique of Waltz (fn. i) is that he has underestimated the cognitive links between 
social entities and their environments. The environment-the international system-is im- 
portant. Types of international systems could (but need not) be conceptualized as operating 
to define domains such as the A and -A contexts dicussed in our example in the previous 
section. Nevertheless, Waltz artificially separates the "entity" and the "environment," using 
the Sprouts' terms for the "ecological triad" (Sprout and Sprout, fn. I3). He seems to ignore 
the third leg of that triad, the entity-environment relationship, which must have a cognitive 
component. The "enduring anarchic character of international politics" (fn. i, p. 66), which 
he regards as the central factor in the analysis, cannot explain the variance in behavior. 
